¤ This survey focuses on a few topics from a vast …eld. Those interested in going further into mechanism design are referred to the following other surveys and textbooks: Corchon
Introduction
Economists are accustomed to letting the "market" solve resource-allocation problems. The primary theoretical justi…cation for this laissez-faire position is the "…rst fundamental theorem of welfare economics" (see Debreu (1957) ), which establishes that, provided all goods are priced, a competitive equilibrium is Pareto e¢cient. Implicit in the "all-goods-priced" hypothesis, however, is the assumption that there are no signi…cant externalities; an externality, after all, can be thought of as an unpriced commodity.
Once externalities are admitted, the …rst welfare theorem no longer applies. Thus, a school of thought dating back to Pigou (1932) , if not earlier, calls for government-imposed "mechanisms" (e.g., taxes on pollution) as a way of redressing the market failure.
In opposition to the Pigouvian school, however, proponents of the Coase Theorem (Coase, 1960) argue that, even in the presence of externalities, economic agents should still be able to ensure a Pareto-e¢cient outcome without government intervention provided that there are no constraints on their ability to bargain and contract. The argument is straightforward: if a prospective allocation is ine¢cient, agents will have the incentive to bargain their way to a Pareto improvement. Thus, even if markets themselves fail, Coasians hold that there is still a case for laissez-faire.
The Coasian position depends, however, on the requirement that any externality present be excludable in the sense that the agent giving rise to it has control over who is and who is not a¤ected by it. A pure public good, which, once created, will be enjoyed by everybody, constitutes the classic example of a nonexcludable externality.
To see what goes wrong with nonexcludable externalities, consider pollution. For many sorts of pollution, particularly that of the atmosphere or sea, it is fairly accurate to say that a polluter cannot choose to pollute one group of agents rather then another, that is, pollution can be thought of as a pure public bad and hence pollution reduction as a public good. Now imagine that there is a set of communities that all emit pollution and are adversely a¤ected by these emissions. Suppose, however, that reducing pollution emission is costly to a community (say, because it entails curtailing or modifying the community's normal activities). It is clear that if communities act entirely on their own, there will be too little pollution reduction, since a community shares the bene…t of its reduction with the other communities but must bear the full cost alone. A Coasian might hope, however, that if communities came together to negotiate a pollution-reduction agreementin which each community agrees to undertake some reduction in exchange for other communities' promises to do the same -a Pareto-e¢cient reduction might be attainable. The problem is, however, that any given community (let us call it "C") will calculate that if all the other communities negotiate an agreement, it is better o¤ not participating. By staying out, C can enjoy the full bene…ts of the negotiated reduction (this is where the nonexcludibility assumption is crucial) without incurring any of the cost. Presumably, the agreed reduction will be somewhat smaller than had C participated (since the bene…ts are being shared among only N ¡ 1 rather then N participants).
However, this di¤erence is likely to be small relative to the considerable saving to C from not bearing any reduction costs (we formalize this argument in section 2 below). Hence, it will pay community C to free-ride on the others' agreement. But since this is true for every community, there will end up being no pollutionreduction agreement at all, i.e., the only reduction undertaken will be on an individual basis. We conclude that, in the case of nonexcludable public goods, even a diehard Coasian should agree that outside intervention is needed to achieve optimality. The government -or some other coercive authority -must be called on to impose a method for determining pollution reduction. We call such a method a mechanism (or game form). Devising a suitable mechanism may, however, be complicated by the fact that the authority might not know critical parameters of the problem (e.g., the potential bene…ts that di¤erent communities enjoy from pollution reduction).
Because environmental issues often entail nonexcludable externalities, the 1 Implicit in this argument is the assumption that the other communities cannot, in e¤ect, coerce community C's participation by threatening, say, to refrain from negotiating any agreement at all if C fails to participate. What we have in mind in the idea that any such threat would not be credible, i.e., it would not actually be carried out if push came to shove. Also implicit is the presumption that community C will not be o¤ered especially favorable terms in order to persuade it to join. But notice that if communities anticipated getting especially attractive o¤ers by staying out of agreements, then they would all have the incentive to drag their heels about negotiating such agreements and so the same conclusion about the inadequacy of relying on negotiated settlements would obtain. For further discussion of these points see Maskin (1994) and Baliga and Maskin (2002) . theory of mechanism design (sometimes called "implementation theory") is particularly pertinent to the economics of the environment. In this short survey, we review some of the major concepts, ideas, and …ndings of the mechanism-design literature and their relevance for the environment.
The Model
There are N players or agents, indexed by j 2 f1; 2; ::; Ng; and a set of social choices (or social decisions) Y with generic element y: Agents have preferences over the social choices, and these depend on their preference parameters or types. Agent j of type µ j 2 £ j has a utility function U j (y; µ j ) (the interpretation of agent j as a …rm is one possibility, in which case U j is …rm j's pro…t function). Let µ´(µ 1 ; ::; µ N ) 2 £´¦ N i=1 £ i be the preference pro…le or state. A choice y is (ex-post) Pareto-e¢cient for preference pro…le µ if there exists no other decision y 0 such that, for all i = 1; :::; N;
with strict inequality for some i. A social choice function (or decision rule )
f is a rule that prescribes an appropriate social choice for each state, i.e., a
We illustrate this set-up with an example based on the discussion of pollution in the Introduction. Suppose that N communities (labelled i = 1; :::; N) would like to reduce their aggregate emission of pollution. Suppose that the gross bene…t to community j of a pollution reduction r is µ j p r where µ j 2 [a; b], and that the cost per unit of reduction is 1. If r j is the reduction of pollution by community j, r = P N i=1 r i , and t j is a monetary transfer to community j, then a social choice y takes the form y = (r 1 ; :::; r N ; t 1 ; :::; t N ); and
We will assume that there is no net source of funds for the N agents, and so for feasibility it must be the case that
The stronger requirement of balance entails that
To see why Coasian bargaining will not lead to Pareto-e¢cient pollution reduction, observe …rst that because preferences are quasi-linear, any e¢cient social choice function that does not entail in…nite transfers (either positive or negative) to some communities must implicitly place equal weight on all communities. Hence, the Pareto-e¢cient reduction r ¤ (µ 1 ; :::; µ N ) will
and so r ¤ (µ i ; :::; µ n ) = (
However, if there is no reduction agreement, community j will choose
Thus, if none of the µ i 's are equal, in equilibrium we must have
and so the total reduction is r ¤¤ (µ 1 ; :::
Note the sharp contrast between (1) . In other words, the optimum reduction di¤ers from the reduction that will actually occur by a factor n 2 4 . Now, suppose that the communities attempt to negotiate the Paretoe¢cient reduction (1) by, say, agreeing to share the costs in proportion to their bene…ts. That is, community j will pay a cost equal to
If instead, however, community j stands back and lets the others undertake the negotiation and costs, it will enjoy a pollution reduction of
and, hence, realize a net payo¤ of
But provided that
(4) exceeds (3), and so community j does better to free-ride on the others' agreement. Furthermore, as we have assumed that all the µ i 's are distinct, notice that (5) must hold for some j, and so a Pareto-e¢cient agreement is not possible. Indeed, the same argument shows that any agreement involving two or more communities is vulnerable to free-riding. Thus, despite the possibility of negotiation, pollution reduction turns out to be no greater than in the case where negotiation is ruled out.
We conclude that some sort of government intervention is called for. Probably the simplest intervention is for the government to impose a vector of quotas (q 1 ; :::; q N ), where for each j , community j is required to reduce pollution by at least the amount q j . If
, then the resulting outcome will be Pareto e¢cient.
Another familiar kind of intervention is for the government to set a vector of subsidies (s 1 ; :::; s N ), where, for each j, community j is paid s j for each unit by which it reduces pollution (actually this is not quite complete: to …nance the subsidies -and thereby ensure feasibility -each community must also be taxed some …xed amount). If
, then the outcome induced by the subsidies will be Pareto e¢cient.
Notice that both these solutions rely on the assumption that the state is veri…able to the government. 2 But the more interesting -and typically harder -case is the one in which the preference pro…le is not veri…able. In that case, there are two particular information environments that have been most intensely studied: …rst, the preference pro…le could, although unobservable to the government, be observable to all the agents (complete information);
or, second, each agent j could observe only his own preference parameter µ j (incomplete information). In either case, the government typically "elicits" the true state by having the agents play a game or mechanism.
Formally, a mechanism is a pair (M; g) where M i is agent i's message Returning to our pollution example, we note that if each community j observes only its own type µ j , the government might have the community "announce" its type so that M j = £ j . As a function of the pro…le of their announcementsμ;
To predict the outcome of the mechanism, we must invoke an equilibrium concept. The appropriate equilibrium concept depends on the information environment, so we study the complete and incomplete information settings separately.
Complete Information
We begin with complete information. This is the case in which all agents observe the preference pro…le (the state) µ but it is unveri…able to the mechanism-imposing authority. It is most likely to be a good approximation when the agents all know one another well, but the authority is a comparative outsider.
Let S be a equilibrium concept such as Nash equilibrium, subgame perfect equilibrium, etc. Let O S (M; g; µ) be the set of equilibrium outcomes of mechanism (M; g) in state µ:
A social choice function f is implemented by the mechanism (M; g) in the
In that case, we say f is implementable in S: Notice that, in every state, we require that all the equilibrium outcomes be optimal (we will say more about this below).
Nash Implementation
Suppose …rst that S is Nash equilibrium. A message pro…le m is a Nash equilibrium in state µ if or more agree and announce the same stateμ; then let g (μ) = f(μ); de…ne the outcome arbitrarily if fewer than N ¡ 1 agents agree. Notice that, if µ is the true state, it is an equilibrium for every agent to announceμ = µ; leading to the outcome f (µ), since a unilateral deviation by any single agent will not change the outcome. However, it is equally well an equilibrium for agents to unanimously announce any other state (and there are many nonunanimous equilibria as well). Hence, uniqueness of the equilibrium outcome is a valuable property of an implementing mechanism.
To ensure that it is possible to construct such a mechanism, we require the social choice function satis…es monotonicity. A social choice function f is monotonic if for any µ; Á 2 £ and y = f(µ) such that y 6 = f(Á); there exists an agent i and outcome y
That is, a social choice function is monotonic if whenever there is an outcome y that is optimal in one state µ but not in another Á, there exists an agent i and an outcome y 0 such that agent i strictly prefers y 0 to y in state Á but weakly prefers y to y 0 in state µ: This is a form of "preference reversal."
The other condition on social choice functions we impose to guarantee implementability is no veto power. A social choice function f satis…es no veto power if whenever agent i; state µ and outcome y are such that U j (y; µ j )U j (y 0 ; µ j ) for all agents j 6 = i and all y 0 2 y; then y = f(µ): That is, if in state µ, N ¡ 1 or more agents agree that the best possible outcome is y; then y is prescribed by f in state µ. Notice that in our pollution example, there is no alternative that any agent thinks is best: an agent would always prefer a bigger monetary transfer. Hence, no veto power is automatically satis…ed.
Theorem 1 (Maskin (1999) ) If a social choice function is implementable in Nash equilibrium, then it is monotonic. If N¸3; a social choice function that satis…es monotonicity and no veto power is Nash implementable.
Proof. Necessity: Suppose f is Nash implementable using the mechanism (M; g): Suppose m is a Nash equilibrium of (M; g) in state µ, where f (µ) = y.
Then, g(m) = y: But, if f(µ) 6 = f(Á); m cannot be a Nash equilibrium in state Á: Therefore, there must exist an agent i with a message m 0 i and an
But because m is a Nash equilibrium in state µ; agent i must be willing to send the message m i rather than m 0 i in state µ: Hence,
implying that f is monotonic.
Su¢ciency: See Maskin (1999).
It is not hard to verify that in out pollution example, the e¢cient social choice function f (µ) = (r 1 (µ); :::; r N (µ); t 1 (µ); :::t N (µ)), where, for all j,
and
is monotonic and hence Nash implementable. To see this, choose µ and µ
0
, and let y = (r 1 ; :::; r N ; t 1 ; :::; t N ) = f(µ). Then, from (6) and (7), r j = µ j P N i=1 µ i 4 and t j = 0 for all j. For concreteness, suppose that, for some j, µ j < µ 0 j . Note that 
From (6)- (11), we have
But because µ 0 j > µ j and
as monotonicity requires.
Here is an alternative but equivalent de…nition of monotonicity: A social choice function is monotonic if, for any µ,Á; and y = f(µ) such that
we have y = f(Á). This rendition of monotonicity says that when the outcome that was optimal in state µ goes up in everyone's preference ordering when the state becomes Á, then it must remain socially optimal. Although this may seem like a reasonable property, monotonicity can be quite a re- 
Other Notions of Implementation
One way to relax monotonicity is to invoke re…nements of Nash equilibrium, which make it easier to knock out unwanted equilibria while retaining optimal 4 Monotonicity is a good deal less restrictive if one considers implementation of social choice correspondences rather than functions (see Maskin (1999) ).
ones. Let us, in particular, explore the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium and the use of sequential mechanisms, i.e., mechanisms in which agents send messages one at a time. We maintain the assumption that the preference pro…le is common knowledge among the agents but is unveri…able by an outside party. Therefore, we consider mechanisms of perfect information and (this is the subgame perfection requirement) strategies that constitute a Nash equilibrium at any point in the game.
Rather than stating general theorems, we focus immediately on our pollution example. For simplicity, restrict attention to the case of two communities (N = 2). We shall argue that any social choice function in this setting is implementable in subgame perfect equilibrium using a sequential mechanism.
We note …rst that, for i = 1; 2 and any µ i ; µ 
Formulas (12) and (13) We claim that, in state (µ 1 ; µ 2 ); there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium of this mechanism, in which agent 1 truthfully announcesμ 1 = µ 1 and agent 2 truthfully announcesμ 2 = µ 2 , so that the equilibrium outcome is f(μ 1 ;μ 2 ). To see this, note that in Stage 2, agent 1 has the incentive to disagree with any untruthful announcementμ 2 6 = µ 2 by settingμ 0 2 = µ 2 . This is because agent 1 forecasts that, by de…nition of (r o 1 (μ 2 ; µ 2 ); r o 2 (μ 2 ; µ 2 ); t o 2 (μ 2 ; µ 2 )) and (r oo 1 (μ 2 ; µ 2 ); r oo 2 (μ 2 ; µ 2 ); t oo 2 (μ 2 ; µ 2 )) and from (13), agent 2 will choose the latter, and so 1 will collect the large sum p ¤ . By contrast, agent 1 will not disagree ifμ 2 is truthful -i.e.,μ 2 = µ 2 -because otherwise (regardless of whatμ 
Incomplete Information
We next turn to incomplete information. This is the case in which agent i observes only his own type µ i .
Dominant Strategies
A mechanism (M; g) that has the property that each agent has a dominant strategy -a strategy that is optimal regardless of the other agents' behavior -is clearly attractive since it means that an agent can determine his optimal message without having to calculate those of other agents, a calculation may be particularly complex under incomplete information.
Formally, a strategy ¹ i for agent i is mapping from his type space £ i to his message space M i : A strategy, ¹ i : £ i ! M i ; is dominant for type µ i if:
A strategy pro…le ¹ = (¹ 1 ; :::; ¹ N ) is a dominant strategy equilibrium if, for all i and µ i , ¹ i (µ i ) is dominant for µ i :
A social choice function f is implemented in dominant strategy equilibrium by the mechanism (M; g) if there exists a dominant strategy equilibrium ¹ for which g(¹(µ)) = f(µ) for all µ 2 £:
5
Of course, implementation in dominant strategy equilibrium is a demanding requirement, and so perhaps not surprisingly it is di¢cult to attain in general:
Theorem 3 (Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite(1975) ) Suppose that £ consists of all strict preference orderings. Then, any social choice function that is implementable in dominant-strategy equilibrium and whose range includes at least three choices is dictatorial.
Proof. Suppose that f is implementable in dominant-strategy equilibrium and that the hypotheses of the theorem hold. Consider µ; µ 0 2 £ such 5 Notice that, unlike with implementation in Nash equilibrium, we require only that some dominant strategy equilibrium outcome coincide with f (µ), rather then that there be a unique equilibrium outcome. However, multiple equilibria are not typically a serious problem with dominant strategies. In particular, when preferences are strict (i.e., indi¤erence is ruled out), the dominant-strategy equilibrium outcome is, indeed, unique. that f(µ) = y and, for all i,
for all y 0 . By assumption, there exists a mechanism (M; g) with a dominantstrategy equilibrium ¹ such that g(¹(µ)) = y. We claim that
To see why (15) holds, suppose that
a contradiction of the assumption that ¹ 1 (µ 1 ) is dominant for µ 1 . Hence, g(¹ 1 (µ 0 1 ); ¹ 2 (µ 2 ); :::; ¹ N (µ N )) = y after all. Continuing iteratively, we obtain
But (17) implies that f(µ 0 ) = y. We conclude that f is monotonic, and so Theorem 2 implies that it is dictatorial.
In contrast to the pessimism of Theorem 3, Vickrey (1961) and, more generally, Clarke (1971) and Groves (1973) have shown that much more positive results are obtainable when agents' preferences are quasi-linear.
Speci…cally, suppose that we wish to implement a social choice function f(µ) = (r 1 (µ); :::; r N (µ); t 1 (µ); :::; t N (µ)) entailing Pareto-e¢cient pollution reduction, i.e., such that
where r ¤ (µ) solves
If community j is not allocated any transfer by the mechanism, then j solves
which clearly does not result in the total reduction being r ¤ (µ). To bring the maximands of individual communities and overall society into line, we shall give community j a transfer equal to the sum of the other communities' payo¤s (net of transfers):
where ¿ j (:) is an arbitrary function of µ ¡j . A mechanism in which each agent j announcesμ j and the outcome is (r 1 (μ); :::; r N (μ); t 1 (μ); :::; t N (μ)) where (r 1 (:); :::; r N (:)) satis…es (18) and (19), and (t 1 (:); :::; t N (:)) satis…es (21), is called a Groves scheme (see Groves (1973) ).
We claim that, in a Groves scheme, community j's telling the truth (announcingμ j = µ j ) is dominant for µ j for all j and all µ j . Observe that in such a mechanism, community j's overall payo¤ if it tells the truth and the other communities announceμ ¡j is
But from (19),
for all r 0 . In particular, (22) holds when r 0 = r ¤ (μ j ;μ ¡j ), which then implies that takingμ j = µ j is dominant as claimed.
Thus, with one proviso, a Groves scheme succeeds in implementing the Pareto-e¢cient pollution reduction. The proviso is that we have not yet ensured that the transfer functions (21) are feasible. One way of ensuring feasibility is to take
for all j .
Then, community j 's transfer becomes
When transfers take the form (23), a Groves scheme is called a pivotal mechanism or a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. Notice that the transfer (23) is always (weakly) negative, ensuring feasibility.
The logic underlying (23) is straightforward. If community j's announcement has no e¤ect on the social choice, the community pays nothing. However, if it does change this choice (i.e., it is "pivotal"), j pays the corresponding loss imposed on the rest of society. Although the pivotal mechanism is feasible, it is not balanced, i.e., the transfers do not sum to zero. Indeed, as shown by Green and La¤ont (1979) , no Groves scheme is balanced.
Furthermore, arguments due to Green and La¤ont (1977) imply that in a slightly more general version of our pollution example, Groves schemes are essentially the only mechanisms that implement social choice functions with
Pareto-e¢cient pollution reductions. This motivates the search for balanced mechanisms that invoke a less demanding notion of implementation than in dominant-strategy equilibrium, a question we turn to in the next subsection.
We have been assuming that each community j's payo¤ depends directly only on its own preference parameter µ j . Radner and Williams (1988) extend the analysis to the case when j's payo¤ may depend on the entire pro…le µ.
We have also been concentrating on the case of Pareto-e¢cient social choice functions (or at least social choice functions for which the pollution reduction is Pareto-e¢cient), Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin (1980) examine dominant-strategy implementation of more general social choice functions.
Bayesian Equilibrium
Dominant-strategy equilibrium requires that each agent be willing to use his equilibrium strategy whatever the behavior of the other agents. Bayesian equilibrium requires only that each agent be willing to use his equilibrium strategy when he expects other agents to do the same. A couple of points are worth noting here. First, because agents' equilibrium strategies depend on their types but, given the incomplete information, an agent does not know others' types, we must specify his beliefs about these types to complete the description of the model. Second, if a social choice function is implementable in dominant-strategy equilibrium, then it is certainly implementable in Bayesian equilibrium, so by moving to the latter concept, we are weakening the notion of implementation.
We assume that agents' types are independently distributed; the density and distribution functions for agent i of type
respectively. We suppose that these distributions are common knowledge amongst the agents. Hence, the c.d.f. for agent i's beliefs over the types of the other agents is given by F i (µ ¡i )´Q j6 =i P j (µ j ).
There are two critical conditions that a social choice function must satisfy to ensure that it is implementable in Bayesian equilibrium (see Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986) , Palfrey and Srivastava (1989) and Jackson (1991) ).
The …rst is Bayesian incentive-compatibility. A social choice function f is
for all i; and µ i ; µ 0 i 2 £ i , where
The second condition is the incomplete-information counterpart to monotonicity. For this purpose, we de…ne a deception for agent j to be a function
A deception ® is a pro…le ® = (® 1 ; :::; ® N ). A social choice function f is Bayesian monotonic if for all deceptions ® such that f ± ® 6 = f there exist j and a function°: £ ¡j ! Y such that
for all µ j 2 £ j ; and Jackson (1991) shows that in quasi-linear settings, such as our pollution example, BIC and Bayesian monotonicity are not only necessary but su¢cient for a social choice function to be implementable in Bayesian equilibrium.
Let us return to our pollution example. We noted in the previous subsection that a social choice function entailing Pareto-e¢cient pollution reduction (i.e., reduction satisfying (18) and (19)) cannot be implemented in dominantstrategy equilibrium if it is balanced. However, this negative conclusion no longer holds with Bayesian implementation.
To see this, consider a pollution reduction pro…le (r o 1 (µ); :::; r o N (µ)) that is Pareto-e¢cient (i.e.,
, where r ¤ (:) satis…es (19)). Consider the mechanism in which each agent j announcesμ j and the outcome is 
Notice that the …rst term (integral) on the right-hand side of (24) is just the expectation of the sum in (21). Furthermore the other terms in (24) do not depend onμ j . Hence, this mechanism can be thought of as an "expected Groves scheme." It was …rst proposed by Arrow (1979) and d 'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1979) .
The terms after the …rst integral in (24) (24), but with all but the …rst term omitted (since the other terms on the right-hand side of (24) 
By de…nition of r ¤ (µ), the square-bracketed expression in (26) is maximized when µ 0 j = µ j . Hence from (25) and (26), we have
as required for BIC.
One can readily show that f also satis…es Bayesian monotonicity (but we will refrain from doing so here). Hence, we conclude that it is implementable in Bayesian equilibrium (actually, it turns out that the equilibrium outcome of the expected Groves mechanism is not unique, so, without modi…cation, that mechanism does not actually implement f). Thus, relaxing the notion of implementability from dominant-strategy to Bayesian equilibrium permits the implementation of balanced social choice functions. On the downside, however, note that the very construction of the expected Groves mechanism (or an expected Groves mechanism that is modi…ed so as to ensure unique equilibrium) requires common knowledge of the distribution of µ.
